Atypical Minds: the Cognitive Science of Difference and Potentialities
Cognitio 2015
Young researchers conference in cognitive science
Montréal, June 8th, 9th and 10th 2015
A Pluralistic Account of Social Cognition in Autism Spectrum Disorder
Tracy P. Van Wagner.
I will argue that a full account of the social abilities and impairments associated with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) will involve insights from both a theory theory account of social cognition and situated cognition. Some proponents of theory theory argue that the social impairments associated with ASD are the result of an impaired theory of mind (Gopnik, Capps and Meltzoff 2000). Proponents of situated cognition argue that individuals with ASD are deficient in the use of non-inferential situated techniques. Furthermore, proponents of situated cognition argue that some high-functioning individuals instead tend to rely more upon an inferential and theoretical understanding of the mental states of others that is similar to a theory theory account of social cognition. Some of these arguments seem to make the assumption that individuals with ASD are skilled in theory use and construction. It is, in part, this reliance upon theoretical techniques that leads to social impairments (Gallagher 2005).
I will argue that the accounts of the social impairments associated with ASD offered by the proponents of theory theory and situated cognition are not mutually exclusive. Research on infants who are later diagnosed with ASD indicates that they are not gathering the same amount and type of social information as typically developing (TD) infants due to their motor and attentional abnormalities. The same early impairments that lead to the impairments of the non-inferential processes endorsed by situated accounts may also lead to the development of an insufficient theory of mind. Furthermore, Gopnik, et al. argue that individuals with ASD may be impaired in theory development. The theories that individuals with ASD construct may be more superficial than the deeper and more holistic theories developed by TD individuals. These theories may not allow the individuals with ASD to make novel predictions or to engage with new situations or information in a quick and flexible manner (Gopnik, Capps and Meltzoff 2000).
First-person narratives from some high-functioning individuals with ASD indicate that they build and refine theories, models, and scripts about social interactions when observing and engaging in social interactions and rely upon these theories, models, and scripts in social situations. Research has also indicated a reliance on verbal cues, verbal mediation, and simulation (Wright, et al. 2008). Second, research indicates that the attentional deficiencies found in infants and children with ASD persist into adolescence and adulthood. When in a social environment, individuals with ASD are not paying adequate attention to the social elements of the situation and tend to focus more upon non-social background elements than TD individuals (Klin, Jones, et al. 2003).
Individuals with ASD are not taking in the necessary social cues available in the social environment in order to flexibly interact and adapt to the current and ever-changing social situation through the use of non-inferential situated techniques and inferential theoretical techniques. Some high-functioning individuals with ASD compensate through an increased reliance upon theories, models, scripts, and other strategies in order to participate in social interactions. However, these theories, models, and scripts are incomplete and inflexible. Furthermore, individuals are not gathering adequate social input for use with their theories, models, and scripts. The social impairments and abilities associated with ASD thus seem to be the result of both impaired situated techniques and an impaired theory of mind.
Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, Alison, Lisa Capps, and Andrew N. Meltzoff. 2000. "Early theories of mind: what the theory theory can tell us about autism." In Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, by Simon Baron-Cohen, Helen Tager-Flusberg and Donald J. Cohen, 50-72. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Klin, Ami, Warren Jones, Robert Schultz, and Fred Volkmar. 2003. "The enactive mind, or from actions to cognition: lessons from autism." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 345-360.
Wright, Barry, Natalie Clarke, Jo Jordan, Andrew W. Young, Paula Clarke, Jeremy Miles, Kate Nation, Leesa Clarke, and Christine Williams. 2008. "Emotion recognition in faces and the use of visual context in young people with high-functioning autism spectrum disorders." Autism 607-626.