Atypical Minds: the Cognitive Science of Difference and Potentialities
Cognitio 2015
Young researchers conference in cognitive science
Montréal, June 8th, 9th and 10th 2015
Atypicality, Cognitive Science and the Limits of Functional Analysis
Eric Kraemer.
Mental atypicality has multiple sources. Some cases of atypical abilities are simply extreme points on ability continua, such as those with acute senses of smell (“noses”) or photographic memories as opposed to others at the other end of the ability spectrum with extremely limited abilities in these areas. Some instances of atypicality involve computational deficiencies that are genetically induced (such as color blindness) or trauma-induced (including fetal alcohol syndrome). Other occurrences of atypicality involve unusual combinations of mental activities, such as synesthesia. Further there are unusual mental conditions such as the many mental diseases which may be the result of a variety of the sorts of causes already mentioned but often also include an important social component. As an examination of these different items makes clear, some instances of atypicality are defined purely statistically, in terms of what is different from what is normally expected in mental activity, while other instances are defined according to criteria relating to those conditions that are considered healthy or unhealthy for an individual to possess. Further, some instances of atypicality are regarded as benign or beneficial while other instances are taken to be harmful.
The question of atypical minds raises a serious concern for the leading physicalist account of mind in the philosophy of mind, namely ‘Functionalism’. According to the standard functionalist story, mental states are to be understood as characterized by the syndrome of their typical causes and effects. The standard argument that moved physicalists away from allegiance to the earlier mind-brain identity theory to the more permissive functionalist approach is the concern that, since more than one specific type of brain state could presumably be associated with a given mental state, what physicalists should instead support is a philosophical view that allows for such “multiple realizability” of mental states by different physical states.
The most common objection that defenders of functionalism face is that no elaboration of typical causal roles sufficiently elucidates the qualitative character of experience. Known as the “qualia problem”, this issue continues to divide philosophers of mind. But, there is a second, and usually under-appreciated problem that the question of typicality/atypicality also raises for functionalists. This is the worry that if there are several different typical causal roles (where a causal role is defined as a syndrome of causes and effects) that a particular mental state may play in different mental conditions, then there is no way to determine, without facing the charge of arbitrariness, which causal role is the single correct role that is to define the condition in question. This suggests that functionalism, although it is the dominant physicalist view in the philosophy of mind, is in fact of limited usefulness for accounting for the wide range of atypical mental phenomena cognitive researchers and clinicians confront.
In this presentation I first present several examples of multiple causal roles that derive from considering normal and atypical conditions that raise the problem of atypicality for philosophical functionalism. I then consider three different approaches to attempting to solve the problem--a conceptual approach, an evolutionary strategy and one based on current cognitive scientific research, and contend that all of them fail to rescue functionalism adequately from the problem of atypicality. I argue that the important philosophical lesson to be learned from a careful study of mental atypicality is that, while functionalism may provide part of the correct physicalist account of the mental, a more pluralistic philosophical account, one which also incorporates significant elements from the previously discarded mind-brain identity theory must be developed. Some suggestions towards such an account are provided.