Nonhuman Minds: Animal, Artificial or Other Minds
Cognitio 2011
Young researchers conference in cognitive science
Montréal, July 3rd, 4th and 5th 2011
Young children´s reasoning about knowledge in others - The case of limited human and omniscient supernatural agents
Florian Kießling and Josef Perner
Abstract:
Recent theory of mind research has compared children´s understanding of mental states in humans versus superhuman agents (e.g., Christian God). Based on this research, the preparedness-view states that young children perceive other intentional beings by default as omniscient but make flexible attributions to different agents. The alternative anthropomorphism-view emphasizes that children make “human-like“, inflexible attributions to all kinds of intentional agents. As default here, reality-bias has been suggested, i.e. the reference to the state of reality rather than to mental states of the other.
In the present study we tested the default and flexibility assumptions of 109 children aged 3-5 years in a perception-knowledge task. Here, the child and two human puppets (mother and baby) received varying visual access to an object hidden in a box. All possible combinations of visual access were tested once, leading to 8 knowledge questions about mother, baby and God each. In two additional trials justification questions were asked.
As expected, the understanding of perception-based knowledge in humans increased significantly from 3-5 years of age. Children grasping this relationship (epistemic) responded adequately to all questions. By contrast and in contradiction to existing default assumptions, children still failing (pre-epistemic) responded for both humans and God in several distinctive patterns (affirmation, negation and egocentrism). Further on, pre-epistemic children showed flexibility in more affirmations for mother than baby also expressed in naming more ‘enabling’ causes, independent of actual perception. About half of the pre-epistemic children responded identically for God and humans, while the remaining pre- and all epistemic children discriminated between both. However, in the youngest children discriminating, no affirmation but largely negation was found for God. Just as affirmation for God increased with age, so did supernatural explanations. These findings suggest supernatural concepts to build on a thorough understanding of human concepts, rather than the reverse.
In the present study we tested the default and flexibility assumptions of 109 children aged 3-5 years in a perception-knowledge task. Here, the child and two human puppets (mother and baby) received varying visual access to an object hidden in a box. All possible combinations of visual access were tested once, leading to 8 knowledge questions about mother, baby and God each. In two additional trials justification questions were asked.
As expected, the understanding of perception-based knowledge in humans increased significantly from 3-5 years of age. Children grasping this relationship (epistemic) responded adequately to all questions. By contrast and in contradiction to existing default assumptions, children still failing (pre-epistemic) responded for both humans and God in several distinctive patterns (affirmation, negation and egocentrism). Further on, pre-epistemic children showed flexibility in more affirmations for mother than baby also expressed in naming more ‘enabling’ causes, independent of actual perception. About half of the pre-epistemic children responded identically for God and humans, while the remaining pre- and all epistemic children discriminated between both. However, in the youngest children discriminating, no affirmation but largely negation was found for God. Just as affirmation for God increased with age, so did supernatural explanations. These findings suggest supernatural concepts to build on a thorough understanding of human concepts, rather than the reverse.