Cognitio 2011

Abstract: Cases such as that of Terry Schiavo raise not only empirical and medical questions regarding the diagnosis of seemingly unconscious individuals but also philosophical and scientific questions regarding the nature of nonhuman mind. This presentation critically examines criteria for the existence of consciousness in nonhuman creatures by analyzing the case of individuals in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). The question of whether individuals in PVS are conscious concerns the ethical approach toward their treatment. Whether and what kind of consciousness an agent possess greatly affects our attitude toward the agent. Recently brain imaging findings have offered a new perspective on the abovementioned question. On the one hand, I interpret that PVS brain imaging finding do not necessarily suggest that a PVS patient is conscious. On the other hand, brain imaging results pose a significant question to the traditional concept of consciousness. Several philosophers such as Peter Carruthers and bioethicists such as Peter Singer claim that phenomenal consciousness or sentience is the criterion that attributes an ethical status to animate beings. However, I claim that it is conceivable that an ethical status be attributed to individuals not possessing sentience. First, I argue that “phenomenal consciousness” is a heterogeneous concept. It can be further divided into sub-concepts. Second, by appealing in favor of neuroscientific findings and a thought experiment, I argue that phenomenal consciousness and sentience are dissociable. If an individual does not possess phenomenal consciousness, it is reasonable to suspect that the subject has no basic interest such as pleasure or pain. Additionally, phenomenal consciousness is a prerequisite for an individual to experience pleasure and pain. However, one’s having phenomenal consciousness does not guarantee that s/he possesses the capability of feeling pleasure and pain. Third, I argue that attributing an ethical status only to individuals who have phenomenal consciousness with sentience is akin to speciesism, sexism, racism, and ageism. From this, I conclude that sentience is not an essential premise for consciousness, and we should confer ethical status to beings possessing the phenomenal state without sentience. If my claim is plausible, it will help reexamine ethical issues surrounding marginal cases such as those of fetuses, the comatose, the cognitively disabled, and non-human animals.