Nonhuman Minds: Animal, Artificial or Other Minds
Cognitio 2011
Young researchers conference in cognitive science
Montréal, July 3rd, 4th and 5th 2011
Is negation possible without language? Displacement in preverbal infants and chimpanzees
Valentina Cuccio
Abstract:
Is negation possible without language? Displacement in preverbal infants and chimpanzees
Up until now, negation seems to be a distinctive feature of human language. To date we do not know of any animal communication system that has negation.
In a recent work Liszkowski et al. (2009) addressed the question of displacement, a characteristic capacity of human language used to talk about absent entities. According to Liszkowski et al. (2009) there is not any animal communication system that shows displacement.
So far, it could seem that Liszkowski et al. (2009) are following mainstream thought according to which negation is linguistic. No language, no negation. No language, no displacement. However, Liszkowski et al. (2009) carried out an experiment that aimed to demonstrate that prelinguistic infants can communicate about absent entities by using pointing gestures, while chimpanzees cannot. The main hypothesis of the study is that displacement does not depend on language but is, however, exclusively human and instead depends on species-specific social-cognitive human skills.
In this paper I am going to discuss this hypothesis by claiming that a symbolic representation is needed in order to communicate absence. Thus, language seem to be necessary in order to express displacement. Moreover, even if infants of Liszkowski et al. (2009) study are said to be preverbal, it is worth noting that they are 12 month-old children. They may not yet be speakers being preverbal is not the same as being alinguistic. In other words, a 12 month-old infant can already have symbolic representations even if she is not yet able to speak verbally. In fact, if we look at studies on the acquisition of language, we will see that symbolic gestures are early forms of communication, sometimes even occurring before first words. Language starts in tandem with gestures and words (Acredolo and Goodwyn 1988, 450).
By looking at first-language learning in infancy, we can see, following Dimroth (2010), three steps in the acquisition of linguistic negation: 1) rejection/refusal; 2) disappearance/ non-existence/unfulfilled expectation; 3) denial.
According to many studies (see Dimroth 2010 for a review) the second category of linguistic negation to arise is disappearance/non-existence/unfulfilled expectation. This kind of negation, according to these studies, requires an abstract symbolic representation.
Hence, displacement arises in the second phase of the acquisition of linguistic negation. Following Liszkowski et al. (2009) we can predate displacement in the preverbal period. However, by using gestures in the way Liszkowski et al. described, 12 month-old infants show to have already started a symbolic intentional communication. This is to say that they have already entered the linguistic game. Liszkowski et al. (2009) concluded their work by presenting the case of a deaf child of hearing parents. The child was not exposed to a conventional language and, nevertheless, started to use pointing gestures to express displacement. So, this is a proof, according to Liszkowski et al. (2009), that exposure to language is not necessary for displacement. But we should note that the child used pointing gestures in a home-sign language that he developed with his parents.
Does a home-sign language have the same expressiveness of chimpanzees’s vocalizations or bees’s dances? I think that it is, at least, an intentional communication realised by means of shared symbols (Goldin-Meadow 1993). It would be impressive if the child had used pointing gestures out of any intentional symbolic communication. Following the argument of Liszkowski et al. (2009) about the deaf child we would have to equate a home-sign language to a non symbolic animal communication system. Is this true? This is the only case where it could be correct to say that displacement does not need language and symbolic representations. But I do not think this is the case.
Concluding, I can say that displacement is a symbolic operation and, thus, it depends on language.
References
Acredolo L. Goodwyn S. 1988, “Symbolic gesturing in normal infants”, Child development, 59,
450-466.
longitudinal study”. Journal of Child Language 15: 517-531.
Dimroth C. 2010. “The acquisition of negation”. In L.R. Horn (Ed.), The expression of negation.
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter Mouton, 39-72 .
Goldin-Meadow S. (1993), “When does gesture become language? A study of gesture used as a
primary communication system by deaf children of hearing parents”, in K.R. Gibson, T.
Ingold (eds), Tools, language and cognition in human evolution, Cambridge, Cambridge
University
Press, 63-85.
Liszkowski U., Schafer M., Carpenter M., Tomasello M. (2009), “Prelinguistic infants, but not
chimpanzees, communicate about absent entities”, Psychological Science, Vol. 20, 5, 654-
660.
Up until now, negation seems to be a distinctive feature of human language. To date we do not know of any animal communication system that has negation.
In a recent work Liszkowski et al. (2009) addressed the question of displacement, a characteristic capacity of human language used to talk about absent entities. According to Liszkowski et al. (2009) there is not any animal communication system that shows displacement.
So far, it could seem that Liszkowski et al. (2009) are following mainstream thought according to which negation is linguistic. No language, no negation. No language, no displacement. However, Liszkowski et al. (2009) carried out an experiment that aimed to demonstrate that prelinguistic infants can communicate about absent entities by using pointing gestures, while chimpanzees cannot. The main hypothesis of the study is that displacement does not depend on language but is, however, exclusively human and instead depends on species-specific social-cognitive human skills.
In this paper I am going to discuss this hypothesis by claiming that a symbolic representation is needed in order to communicate absence. Thus, language seem to be necessary in order to express displacement. Moreover, even if infants of Liszkowski et al. (2009) study are said to be preverbal, it is worth noting that they are 12 month-old children. They may not yet be speakers being preverbal is not the same as being alinguistic. In other words, a 12 month-old infant can already have symbolic representations even if she is not yet able to speak verbally. In fact, if we look at studies on the acquisition of language, we will see that symbolic gestures are early forms of communication, sometimes even occurring before first words. Language starts in tandem with gestures and words (Acredolo and Goodwyn 1988, 450).
By looking at first-language learning in infancy, we can see, following Dimroth (2010), three steps in the acquisition of linguistic negation: 1) rejection/refusal; 2) disappearance/ non-existence/unfulfilled expectation; 3) denial.
According to many studies (see Dimroth 2010 for a review) the second category of linguistic negation to arise is disappearance/non-existence/unfulfilled expectation. This kind of negation, according to these studies, requires an abstract symbolic representation.
Hence, displacement arises in the second phase of the acquisition of linguistic negation. Following Liszkowski et al. (2009) we can predate displacement in the preverbal period. However, by using gestures in the way Liszkowski et al. described, 12 month-old infants show to have already started a symbolic intentional communication. This is to say that they have already entered the linguistic game. Liszkowski et al. (2009) concluded their work by presenting the case of a deaf child of hearing parents. The child was not exposed to a conventional language and, nevertheless, started to use pointing gestures to express displacement. So, this is a proof, according to Liszkowski et al. (2009), that exposure to language is not necessary for displacement. But we should note that the child used pointing gestures in a home-sign language that he developed with his parents.
Does a home-sign language have the same expressiveness of chimpanzees’s vocalizations or bees’s dances? I think that it is, at least, an intentional communication realised by means of shared symbols (Goldin-Meadow 1993). It would be impressive if the child had used pointing gestures out of any intentional symbolic communication. Following the argument of Liszkowski et al. (2009) about the deaf child we would have to equate a home-sign language to a non symbolic animal communication system. Is this true? This is the only case where it could be correct to say that displacement does not need language and symbolic representations. But I do not think this is the case.
Concluding, I can say that displacement is a symbolic operation and, thus, it depends on language.
References
Acredolo L. Goodwyn S. 1988, “Symbolic gesturing in normal infants”, Child development, 59,
450-466.
longitudinal study”. Journal of Child Language 15: 517-531.
Dimroth C. 2010. “The acquisition of negation”. In L.R. Horn (Ed.), The expression of negation.
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter Mouton, 39-72 .
Goldin-Meadow S. (1993), “When does gesture become language? A study of gesture used as a
primary communication system by deaf children of hearing parents”, in K.R. Gibson, T.
Ingold (eds), Tools, language and cognition in human evolution, Cambridge, Cambridge
University
Press, 63-85.
Liszkowski U., Schafer M., Carpenter M., Tomasello M. (2009), “Prelinguistic infants, but not
chimpanzees, communicate about absent entities”, Psychological Science, Vol. 20, 5, 654-
660.