Esprits non-humains: cognition animale, artificielle ou autre
Cognitio 2011
Colloque jeunes chercheurs en sciences cognitives
Montréal, les 3, 4, et 5 juillet 2011.
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Transitive Preference and Animal Cognition
Ryan Daley et Brian Glenney
Abstract:
Transitive Preference and Animal Cognition
As science attempts to broaden its understanding of cognition, empirical tests are not only being conducted on humans, but animals are being taken into account as well. Literature suggests that transitivity is one of the deciding factors of cognition. That is, without it, a being is incapable of having cognitive thought processes (Regenwetter, Davis-Stober, & Dana 2011; Tversky 1969). Transitivity is what potentially separates normally functioning human beings from the rest of the inhabitants of the world. More specifically, transitive preference is the main factor contributing to evidential cognitive processes (Regenwetter et al. 2011; Tversky 1969). Transitive preference can be understood by the ordering of choices. That is, if X is chosen over Y, and Y is chosen over Z, then logically, X should be chosen over Z as well:
If X > Y, and Y > Z, then X > Z
As the main purpose of this study is to better understand cognition within nonhuman animals, the question of which animals have the capability to perform transitive preference comes to view. To answer such a question, one must look at the brain, or more specifically, the hippocampus. Literature suggests that transitive processes are located within the hippocampus. Bunsey & Eichenbaum (1996) found that rats with hippocampus deficiencies were incapable of showing transitivity. Their normally functioning counterparts, however, exemplified the trait completely. This study also suggests that rats’ use of non-spatial memory to guide decision-making.
Rats have not been the only non-primate animals to be studied for transitivity. Pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) and Scrub-jays (Aphelocoma Californica) have also been studied to understand the transitive processes in social complexity theory (Bond, Kamil, & Balda 2003). Social complexity theory connects to transitivity because relationships within communities can be transitively established based on social interactions. The Bond et al. (2003) study suggests that Pinyon jays are better able to recognize social rank because of their large social groups, compared to that of their relative the scrub-jay. This would imply that transitivity can be brought upon by evolution. As larger social groups provide the means for transitive social ranking, it seems as though evolution is a viable explanation for such a finding. Similar findings have occurred with clownfish (Amphiprion percula) size to social ranking ratios. Heg, Bender, & Hamilton (2004) provide evidence that clownfish can change size based on their social ranking within a school. The lesser dominant males will in fact prevent themselves from growing so as not to be seen as a threat to the dominant male. Once a larger fish within the group is removed however, smaller fish will allow themselves to grow to fill the social gap. This appears to be yet another example of transitivity based on evolutionary processes.
This paper will attempt to further the examination of the potential of transitive preference to study animal cognition. For instance, does transitive preference really suggest that human cognition is continuous with animal cognition? What would it mean for an animal to fail a transitive ordering of their preferences? Would it entail, as it does often with humans, an ability to engage in second-order thoughts? For instance, do we find that higher-order animals are able to engage in non-transitive preference ordering of food selection, suggesting that their selection is guided by anticipation of pleasure rather than mere protein? Is it that case that the preferences of lower-order animals are pre-determined by transitive orderings? This paper will conclude with suggestions for future experimental research in animal cognition that uses transitive preference ordering.
As science attempts to broaden its understanding of cognition, empirical tests are not only being conducted on humans, but animals are being taken into account as well. Literature suggests that transitivity is one of the deciding factors of cognition. That is, without it, a being is incapable of having cognitive thought processes (Regenwetter, Davis-Stober, & Dana 2011; Tversky 1969). Transitivity is what potentially separates normally functioning human beings from the rest of the inhabitants of the world. More specifically, transitive preference is the main factor contributing to evidential cognitive processes (Regenwetter et al. 2011; Tversky 1969). Transitive preference can be understood by the ordering of choices. That is, if X is chosen over Y, and Y is chosen over Z, then logically, X should be chosen over Z as well:
If X > Y, and Y > Z, then X > Z
As the main purpose of this study is to better understand cognition within nonhuman animals, the question of which animals have the capability to perform transitive preference comes to view. To answer such a question, one must look at the brain, or more specifically, the hippocampus. Literature suggests that transitive processes are located within the hippocampus. Bunsey & Eichenbaum (1996) found that rats with hippocampus deficiencies were incapable of showing transitivity. Their normally functioning counterparts, however, exemplified the trait completely. This study also suggests that rats’ use of non-spatial memory to guide decision-making.
Rats have not been the only non-primate animals to be studied for transitivity. Pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) and Scrub-jays (Aphelocoma Californica) have also been studied to understand the transitive processes in social complexity theory (Bond, Kamil, & Balda 2003). Social complexity theory connects to transitivity because relationships within communities can be transitively established based on social interactions. The Bond et al. (2003) study suggests that Pinyon jays are better able to recognize social rank because of their large social groups, compared to that of their relative the scrub-jay. This would imply that transitivity can be brought upon by evolution. As larger social groups provide the means for transitive social ranking, it seems as though evolution is a viable explanation for such a finding. Similar findings have occurred with clownfish (Amphiprion percula) size to social ranking ratios. Heg, Bender, & Hamilton (2004) provide evidence that clownfish can change size based on their social ranking within a school. The lesser dominant males will in fact prevent themselves from growing so as not to be seen as a threat to the dominant male. Once a larger fish within the group is removed however, smaller fish will allow themselves to grow to fill the social gap. This appears to be yet another example of transitivity based on evolutionary processes.
This paper will attempt to further the examination of the potential of transitive preference to study animal cognition. For instance, does transitive preference really suggest that human cognition is continuous with animal cognition? What would it mean for an animal to fail a transitive ordering of their preferences? Would it entail, as it does often with humans, an ability to engage in second-order thoughts? For instance, do we find that higher-order animals are able to engage in non-transitive preference ordering of food selection, suggesting that their selection is guided by anticipation of pleasure rather than mere protein? Is it that case that the preferences of lower-order animals are pre-determined by transitive orderings? This paper will conclude with suggestions for future experimental research in animal cognition that uses transitive preference ordering.