Esprits non-humains: cognition animale, artificielle ou autre
Cognitio 2011
Colloque jeunes chercheurs en sciences cognitives
Montréal, les 3, 4, et 5 juillet 2011.
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Animals, Cognition and Sentience: reconsidering various anthropocentric views of sentient Being
Sandra Alexander
Abstract:
In phenomenological philosophy, there are many obvious (and some not so obvious), distinctions made between the notions of perception and cognition. Perception is often linked to sentience (meaning the ability to perceive, to be conscious of or to feel/sense) and can be opposed to cognition or the notion of cognizance (meaning able to ‘think’, cogitate, reflect, etc.).
The early work of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty points in the direction of a consideration of perception (vs. cognition) as a broad, ‘animal’ phenomenon and a basis for the concept of sentience. In particular, Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Pavlovian reflex theory and his own arguing for perception as dialectic, beginning with his The Structure of Behavior (1942), clear the ground for a discussion of sensation and perception of its classic anthropocentric biases and cognitive associations. Although Merleau-Ponty admittedly distinguishes between what he calls ‘the unity of signification in the organism’ (whereby organism he means non-human animal) and ‘properly human consciousness,’ we may still find the outlines of argument in favor of a notion of perception shared by humans and non-human species that makes no appeal to cognitive abilities, whether they be similar or different across the animal kingdom.
In this current paper, I will pursue various questions relating to the lines drawn between animal perception (and alongside it, sentience) and cognition in the phenomenological tradition, and look at some of the anomalistic responses to this issue within this tradition. Notably, the work of Martin Heidegger offers provocative evidence that the phenomenological movement has not always spoken with one voice on the subject of cognition and its remaining separate from notions of sentience. With this in mind, the current paper will engage questions such as: against the philosophical trend, has cognition played a part in our understanding of sentience? Should cognition be a part of our understanding of sentience? Is the question of whether non-human animals have minds at all relevant to our understanding of sentience?
It is believed that the answers to such questions, although not entirely anticipated, will cast light upon anthropocentric tendencies to define sentience in terms of its proximity to human cognitive abilities and in terms somewhat unique to human embodiment. From such questions and responses, it is hoped that a broader definition of sentience, more inclusive of the vagaries of non-human experience, can be fleshed out.
The early work of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty points in the direction of a consideration of perception (vs. cognition) as a broad, ‘animal’ phenomenon and a basis for the concept of sentience. In particular, Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Pavlovian reflex theory and his own arguing for perception as dialectic, beginning with his The Structure of Behavior (1942), clear the ground for a discussion of sensation and perception of its classic anthropocentric biases and cognitive associations. Although Merleau-Ponty admittedly distinguishes between what he calls ‘the unity of signification in the organism’ (whereby organism he means non-human animal) and ‘properly human consciousness,’ we may still find the outlines of argument in favor of a notion of perception shared by humans and non-human species that makes no appeal to cognitive abilities, whether they be similar or different across the animal kingdom.
In this current paper, I will pursue various questions relating to the lines drawn between animal perception (and alongside it, sentience) and cognition in the phenomenological tradition, and look at some of the anomalistic responses to this issue within this tradition. Notably, the work of Martin Heidegger offers provocative evidence that the phenomenological movement has not always spoken with one voice on the subject of cognition and its remaining separate from notions of sentience. With this in mind, the current paper will engage questions such as: against the philosophical trend, has cognition played a part in our understanding of sentience? Should cognition be a part of our understanding of sentience? Is the question of whether non-human animals have minds at all relevant to our understanding of sentience?
It is believed that the answers to such questions, although not entirely anticipated, will cast light upon anthropocentric tendencies to define sentience in terms of its proximity to human cognitive abilities and in terms somewhat unique to human embodiment. From such questions and responses, it is hoped that a broader definition of sentience, more inclusive of the vagaries of non-human experience, can be fleshed out.