Esprits non-humains: cognition animale, artificielle ou autre
Cognitio 2011
Colloque jeunes chercheurs en sciences cognitives
Montréal, les 3, 4, et 5 juillet 2011.
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The Group Mind
Kellie Williamson
Abstract:
The notion of a ‘group mind’ has a chequered past in philosophy and the social sciences. It has been associated with strange metaphysical claims about the downward causal powers of the group over individuals’ cognition in philosophy. In the social sciences it has been associated with Durkheim’s claim that statistical regularities overthrow individuals’ intentional psychology. In this paper a philosophically and scientifically plausible account of group minds and group cognition is developed. It avoids any mysterious metaphysics and is compatible with existing empirical research in the cognitive and psychological sciences. Importantly, the account offered is inclusive enough to accommodate a variety of groups and social interactions from organising committees, to sports teams and smaller, informal groups such as families and intimate couples. This approach can be contrasted with both Phillip Pettit’s and Shaun Gallagher’s emphasis on formal groups, whose primary modes of communication are written and verbal exchanges.
To begin, I re-characterise the relationship between wholes and parts, as it applies to groups of people. A group is indeed more than the sum of its parts, but as I argue, this can still be a naturalist position. To support this, I borrow from recent work in the philosophy of science on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. This provides a way of understanding the relation between parts and wholes, while side-stepping any mysterious metaphysics. It has the added value, as demonstrated throughout the paper, of helping to unify a diverse body of research on social interactions and shared cognition. Most importantly, it draws our attention to the ways that group members constrain and shape each other’s cognitive processes, or more accurately, the various ways that group members’ cognition is coupled together. Drawing on empirical research from cognitive psychology and sports psychology, I identify cases of interdependence between individuals that give rise to emergent, cognitive properties shared by the group. Finally, based on the mechanistic account, and the evidence of mutual cognitive interdependence between group members, the paper culminates in an account of group mental representation. As mental representation is widely considered a key characteristic of cognition, an account of group mental representation offers further support to the claim that groups have minds.
The notion of a ‘group mind’ has a chequered past in philosophy and the social sciences. It has been associated with strange metaphysical claims about the downward causal powers of the group over individuals’ cognition in philosophy. In the social sciences it has been associated with Durkheim’s claim that statistical regularities overthrow individuals’ intentional psychology. In this paper a philosophically and scientifically plausible account of group minds and group cognition is developed. It avoids any mysterious metaphysics and is compatible with existing empirical research in the cognitive and psychological sciences. Importantly, the account offered is inclusive enough to accommodate a variety of groups and social interactions from organising committees, to sports teams and smaller, informal groups such as families and intimate couples. This approach can be contrasted with both Phillip Pettit’s and Shaun Gallagher’s emphasis on formal groups, whose primary modes of communication are written and verbal exchanges.
To begin, I re-characterise the relationship between wholes and parts, as it applies to groups of people. A group is indeed more than the sum of its parts, but as I argue, this can still be a naturalist position. To support this, I borrow from recent work in the philosophy of science on mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. This provides a way of understanding the relation between parts and wholes, while side-stepping any mysterious metaphysics. It has the added value, as demonstrated throughout the paper, of helping to unify a diverse body of research on social interactions and shared cognition. Most importantly, it draws our attention to the ways that group members constrain and shape each other’s cognitive processes, or more accurately, the various ways that group members’ cognition is coupled together. Drawing on empirical research from cognitive psychology and sports psychology, I identify cases of interdependence between individuals that give rise to emergent, cognitive properties shared by the group. Finally, based on the mechanistic account, and the evidence of mutual cognitive interdependence between group members, the paper culminates in an account of group mental representation. As mental representation is widely considered a key characteristic of cognition, an account of group mental representation offers further support to the claim that groups have minds.